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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution, 
Utah Code Ann. SS 78-2a-3(2)(a) and 63-46b-16 and Rule 14 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
ISSUE I 
A. Issue: Whether the Board of Review erroneously 
interpreted the law under Section 35-4-22(j)(5)(A) through (T) by 
(1) failing to analyze all 20 factors as required by the statute; 
(2) analyzing and weighting factors according to categories with-
out statutory direction to do so; and (3) giving extra weight to 
certain factors without statutory authority to do so. 
B. Standard of Review: Correction of error with no 
deference to the Board's interpretation. Chris & Dick's Lumber 
and Hardware v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 791 P.2d 
511r 513 (Utah 1990); Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). 
ISSUE II 
A. Issue: Whether the Board of Review erred in 
applying Section 35-4-22(j)(5) to the facts of this case by: 
(1) ignoring relevant factors "due to the nature" of Tasters' 
business; (2) failing to recognize each factor has two indica-
tors, one indicating employee status and the other independent 
contractor status; and (3) improperly analyzing the underlying 
facts as they relate to the factors. 
B. Standard of Review: Correction of error with no 
deference to the Board's interpretation. Chris & Dick's Lumber 
and Hardware v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 791 P.2d 
511, 513 (Utah 1990); Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988).1 
ISSUE III 
A. Issue: In reviewing the 20 fac tors s e t forth in 
Sect ion 3 5 - 4 - 2 2 ( j ) ( 5 ) ( A ) through (T), did the Board make or imply 
c e r t a i n f indings of fact concerning the demonstrators' r e l a t i o n -
sh ip with Tasters which are not supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence 
when viewed in l i g h t of the whole record; and did the Board f a i l 
to make c e r t a i n f indings of fact that were in favor of Tasters 
that were supported by subs tant ia l evidence in l i g h t of the whole 
record. 
1
 As the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, administrative agencies have 
no special expertise in interpreting statutes, and thus, their statutory 
interpretations are entit led to no deference. See Chris & Dick's Lumber and 
Hardware v . Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990). 
Moreover, the Court should afford the Board of Review's application of law and 
findings l i t t l e , i f any, deference because of due process concerns raised by 
the Administrative Law Judge's multiple functions v i s -a -v i s prosecuting, 
fact-finding, and adjudicating in establishing the record which i s a basis for 
these applications of law and factual findings. See Pickering v. Board of 
Education of Township High School District , 391 U.S. 563, 578 (footnote 2) 
(1968), Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 767 
P.2d 524, 527 (footnote 3) (Utah 1988). 
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B. Standard of Review: The Board's findings of fact 
must be "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court." Grace Drilling Company v. 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 776 P.2d 
63, 67 (Utah 1989).2 
ISSUE IV 
A. Issue: Whether the demonstrators are employees or 
independent contractors under the 20 factors set forth in Section 
35-4-22(j)(5). 
B. Standard of Review: Correction of error with no 
deference to the Board's interpretation. Chris & Dick's Lumber 
and Hardware v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 791 P.2d 
511, 513 (Utah 1990); Hurley v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988).3 
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
Section 35-4-22(j)(5) is set forth in its entirety in 
Appendix A hereto. Section 35-4-22(j)(5) provides, in part: 
(5) Services performed by an individual 
for wages or under any contract of hire, 
written or oral, express or implied, are con-
sidered to be employment subject to this 
chapter, unless it is shown to the satisfac-
tion of the commission that the individual is 
an independent contractor. The commission 
shall analyze all of the facts in Subsections 
(A) through (T) under the common-law rules 
applicable to the employer-employee 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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relationship to determine if an individual is 
an independent contractor* An individual is 
an independent contractor if the weight of 
the evidence supports that finding. The fol-
lowing factors are to be considered if 
applicable: 
[Factors (A) - (T) omitted] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF PROCEEDING, 
This is a petition for review by Tasters Ltd., Inc. 
("Tasters") from the Decision of the Board of Review of The 
Industrial Commission of Utah, Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
(the "Board"), dated July 10, 1990 (Case No. 90-BR-167-T), find-
ing that "the demonstrators in question do not meet the criteria 
of S 35-4-22(j)(5) for independent contractors" and holding that 
the demonstrators are therefore in the employ of Tasters and sub-
ject to coverage under the provisions of the Utah Employment 
Security Act. Record ("R.") 402. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
This proceeding was initiated by Tasters who sought a 
ruling from the Utah Department of Employment Security (the 
"Department") as to the status of demonstrators to whom Tasters 
paid remunerations for services rendered under the Utah Employ-
ment Security Act (the "Act") as a result of the 1989 change in 
the statutory test of an employee versus independent contractor 
under Section 35-4-22(j)(5). On August 31, 1989, the Department 
made a formal determination under the Act that demonstrators are 
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employees of Tasters. Tasters appealed the Department's determi-
nation and on April 18, 1990, Administrative Law Judge Kenneth A. 
Major of the Appeals Tribunal of the Department affirmed the 
Department's declaratory ruling. 
On May 16, 1990, Tasters filed a Notice of Appeal to 
appeal the decision of Administrative Law Judge Major to the 
Board. On July 10, 1990, the Board found that the demonstrators 
do not meet the criteria of Section 35-4-22(j)(5) for independent 
contractors and therefore affirmed the decision of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge. 
III. DECISION OF THE COMMISSION. 
On July 10, 1990, the Board entered its Decision, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix B. In its Decision, 
the Board categorized the 20 factors set forth in Section 
35-4-22(j)(5) by classifying them into four general categories. 
The Board ruled that the first two categories of factors (relat-
ing to amount of direct control exercised by Tasters and the 
extent of integration of demonstrators into Tasters' business) 
indicate that the employment relationship between Tasters and the 
demonstrators is that of employer and employees. The Board found 
that the third group of factors, relating to the legal relation-
ship between Tasters and the demonstrators, favors a conclusion 
of independent contractor status. The Board found that the 
fourth group, pertaining to allocation of expenses and invest-
ment, is neutral. The Board found the first and second 
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categories to be the most "significant" to this case, and thus 
concluded that the weight of the evidence when viewed under the 
standards set forth in Section 35-4-22(j)(5)(A)-(T) does not sup-
port a finding that Tasters' demonstrators are independent con-
tractors. R. 405. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. Tasters engages in the business activity of 
arranging demonstrating services and consulting. Demonstration 
services include arranging demonstrations to demonstrate machin-
ery, equipment, food and other products. R. 208. Most demon-
strations are of food products and are conducted on weekends in 
grocery stores. Tasters presently has three full time employees 
and two part time employees. R. 207. These five employees are 
office staff performing clerical and other administrative func-
tions. R. 207. Tasters maintains a static list of approximately 
2,000 individuals with whom Tasters contracts to do demonstra-
tions. R. 207. Of the 2,000 individuals approximately 450 are 
located in Utah. R. 207. 
2. Tasters contracts with food brokers, distributors 
and manufacturers (hereinafter collectively referred to as "bro-
kers'1) to arrange an individual to demonstrate a particular prod-
uct or food. R. 208. Tasters and the broker negotiate a demon-
stration fee based on the type of demonstration the broker 
desires. R. 208. Tasters typically charges its clients (the 
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brokers) a flat $25 per demonstration plus whatever fee is nego-
tiated with the demonstrator. R. 242-243. 
3. Demonstrators are paid a set fee for each demon-
stration. R. 209. Demonstrators are paid by the job. R. 204. 
Demonstrators are not paid by the hour. R. 209. The demonstra-
tion fee is negotiated, depending on the type, location and hours 
of a demonstration. R. 207. If the demonstrator sells out the 
product before the set time of the demonstration is over, the 
demonstrator is free to leave and will receive the full demon-
stration fee. R. at 174. 
4. Demonstrations are typically for a given period of 
time (noon to 6 p.m. for example). R. 145. The time and day are 
determined by the broker or grocery store, not Tasters. R. 145, 
214. The broker or grocery store is free to change the time of a 
demonstration. R. 214. Likewise, a demonstrator is free to 
negotiate with the broker or store owner to change that time. R. 
214, 223. 
5. Tasters will contact individuals on its list, or 
individuals will contact Tasters regarding the availability of 
demonstrations. R. 222. Approximately 80% of jobs are filled by 
demonstrators soliciting Tasters for a demonstration. R. 222. 
Tasters will inform the individual of the time, place and type of 
demonstration as requested by the broker. The demonstrator is 
free to accept or reject any given demonstration. R. 144-5, 162, 
189. For example, many demonstrators will only work evenings and 
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weekends. R. 222. Some will only work trade shows. R. 222. 
Some will only take certain types of demonstrations; i.e., some 
will not cook, some will not fry, etc. R. 221. Some will only 
work in certain locations. R. 168. The decision to accept or 
reject a job is entirely up to the individual without any reper-
cussions. R. 145, 151, 189. If an individual feels sick or has 
a party on that date, they are free to decline the offer. R. 
189. Tasters does not reprimand or take any disciplinary action 
against individuals who decline jobs. R. 145, 168. 
6. Occasionally, Tasters provides an orientation 
meeting. R. 213. Attendance at these orientations are volun-
tary. R. 159, 213, 217. There is no requirement to attend, and 
there are no repercussions for those who do not attend. R. 159, 
213. Many individuals do not attend an orientation as they have 
done demonstrations before for other companies. R. 181. 
7. Tasters does not train demonstrators. Tasters 
does not have an employee who trains or assists demonstrators. 
R. 218. Demonstrators are not required to take correspondence 
courses. R. 218. Demonstrators are not required to attend sales 
meetings (there are none). R. 218. Tasters does not supervise 
the demonstrators. R. 190, 216. Tasters does not visit the dem-
onstrators or check on performance. R. 216. Occasionally, Tast-
ers will deliver supplies to the demonstrator at a store for rush 
demonstrations. R. 216. Tasters does this as an accommodation 
to its clients and not to check on the demonstrator. R. 216. 
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8. Some of the large manufacturers will request Tast-
ers to set up a training session for demonstrators when a new 
product is being released. R. 181, 211. Attendance at these 
meetings by the demonstrators is voluntary. R. 181, 185, 213. 
Demonstrators who attend, if paid, are paid by the broker. R. 
158, 182, 185. The broker generally runs the training session. 
R. 182, 211. 
9. Tasters does not control or direct the manner in 
which demonstrations are to be conducted. R. 215. The method, 
manner, pace, etc. is entirely at the discretion of the demon-
strator. R. 151, 215, 217. It is the demonstrator who exercises 
her discretion, as to how to best demonstrate and sell a product. 
R. 190, 215, 217. Tasters provides a general "reminder" list to 
demonstrators. R. 216, 232. This list provides 14 "Things to 
Remember" such as "2. Be on Time" or "11. Smile! ! ! Have fun and 
be creative." See Appendix C. 
10. Demonstrators are responsible to provide their own 
equipment used in the demonstrations. R. 153, 229. This equip-
ment is generally a card table, electric frying pan, crock pot, 
table cloth, aprons, and related utensils. R. 166. The cost of 
this equipment varies from approximately $50-$200. R. 153, 172, 
194, 229. Some demonstrators use this equipment very little or 
not at all at home. R. 166, 188. Demonstrators are reimbursed 
for incidental expense of tooth picks, napkins, cups, etc. R. 
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193, 228. The broker reimburses these expenses, not Tasters. R. 
193, 228. 
11. Demonstrators are responsible for any theft, 
breakage, etc. of their equipment. R. 194, 204. Demonstrators 
are likewise responsible for any damages they cause to the pre-
mises or customers of a grocery store. R. 154, 194, Tasters 
will not reimburse or pay these costs. R. 230, 243-4. 
12. Demonstrators complete a one page report at the 
conclusion of the demonstration. R. 147. This report is 
requested by, is prepared for, in many instances is furnished by, 
and is sent to the broker. R. 226-7. The report is used to con-
firm the demonstration occurred, and list incidental expenses to 
be reimbursed by the broker, and provide feedback to the broker 
as to the public acceptance of the product. R. 147, 184. Tast-
ers requests the form only to invoice the demonstration fee to 
the broker. R. 184, 210. 
13. Demonstrators are not required to personally per-
form demonstrations. R. 170, 190. Demonstrators may use substi-
tutes. R. 144, 196, 204. Demonstrators are free to subcontract 
or assign a demonstration to another. R. 144, 205, 218. Many 
times, Tasters has no knowledge of these subcontracts. R. 218, 
219. 
14. Tasters does not reimburse demonstrators for mile-
age or transportation costs. R. 172, 223, 232. Tasters provides 
no office space to demonstrators. R. 232. Demonstrators do not 
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earn vacation pay. R. 232. Demonstrators do not earn sick pay. 
R. 232. Tasters does not evaluate or review demonstrators' per-
formance. R. 216. 
15. Demonstrators are free to do other work. R. 171, 
219. Demonstrators are not required to work full time for Tast-
ers. R. 219. Many demonstrators have other full-time jobs, such 
as a teacher or nurse. R. 223. Many have or are currently work-
ing for other demonstration services. R. 219, 230. Some demon-
strators have contacted brokers directly to do demonstrations. 
R. 187, 219. 
16. Tasters has no formal firing procedure. Individu-
als who have not performed work within the last year are dropped 
from Tasters1 list automatically by a computer. R. 231. 
17. Demonstrators must complete the job to get paid. 
R. 210. If the demonstration is completed, Tasters must pay the 
demonstrator. R. 231. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS 
The Board erred in determining that the demonstrators 
were employees of Tasters in that it incorrectly and improperly 
interpreted the statutory test under Section 35-4-22(j)(5). The 
statute requires that the commission "analyze all of the facts in 
Subsections (A) through (T)." (Emphasis added). Once each fac-
tor is analyzed, it may then be considered if the analysis of the 
underlying facts as they relate to that factor is applicable. 
Contrary to the statutory requirement, the Board first decided if 
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a given factor was relevant, and then made an analysis of the 
underlying facts as they related only to the relevant factors. 
If a factor was determined to be irrelevant, no analysis was made 
of the underlying facts. The Board erred in not following the 
statutory procedure set forth in Section 35-4-22(j)(5). 
Moreover, the Board erred by giving greater weight to 
certain factors. Nowhere in Section 35-4-22(j)(5) does the stat-
ute indicate that certain factors, if applicable, should be con-
sidered "significant" and thus given more weight than others. 
The Board erred in its analysis by giving greater weight to some 
factors, and excluding others. 
The Board also erred in its analysis under Section 
35-4-22(j)(5) by classifying the 20 factors into four arbitrary 
categories and then making a determination based on the weight of 
a category. Nowhere does the statute instruct that the factors 
be divided up in categories. Nowhere does the statute then per-
mit a final decision to be made based on factors within a 
category. 
Next, the Board erred in applying the factors under the 
statute to the facts of this case. Most troubling is the fact 
that the Board completely discounts and ignores approximately 
nine factors stating they are not relevant. Thus, almost 
one-half of the factors the statute requires to be analyzed have 
been ignored by the Board. This result is extremely arbitrary 
and prejudicial to Tasters in that the factors that the Board 
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conveniently ignores are the very factors which show that the 
demonstrators are not subject to the direction and control of 
Tasters and thus are independent contractors. The Board attempts 
to assume away the very issue at hand by ignoring these factors 
because of the "unique nature of Tasters' business." However, 
that is the essence of the inquiry; i.e., the nature of Tasters' 
business is that the demonstrators are not controlled by Tasters 
and are not Tasters' employees. 
Those factors that the Board did analyze, it typically 
did so improperly. The Board failed to realize that the factors 
contain two indicators, one in favor of independent contractor 
status and one in favor of employee status. Just because the one 
indicator relating to independent contractor status is not satis-
fied does not dictate that the opposite employee factor is met. 
A negative response to one, does not require a positive finding 
as to the other. This shortsightedness resulted in erroneous 
conclusions with respect to many of the factors. 
The uncontroverted record sets forth many facts which 
the Board either incorrectly construed or, more importantly, 
failed to recognize. These unsupported factual findings, or lack 
thereof, are discussed in Section III herein. 
Finally, as set forth in Section IV, the weight of the 
evidence under the 20 factors of Section 35-4-22(j)(5) shows that 
the demonstrators are independent contractors. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE BOARD ERRED BY INCORRECTLY AND IMPROPERLY 
CONSTRUING THE LEGAL TESTS SET FORTH IN SEC-
TION 35-4-22(j)(5). 
A. The Board of Review Failed to Analyze 
All Facts in Subsections (A) through 
(T). 
Section 35-4-22(j)(5) sets forth, in part, that in 
determining if an individual is an independent contractor, "the 
commission shall analyze all of the facts in Subsections (A) 
through (T) under the common-law rules applicable to the 
employer-employee relationship." (Emphasis added). The statute 
clearly and succinctly sets forth that all facts under each fac-
tor (A) through (T) must be analyzed. "Analyze" means to study 
4 
or determine the nature and relationship of the parts. There-
fore, under the statute, each factor must be studied. As this 
mandatory analysis of each factor is made, and the underlying 
facts are reviewed in light of each specific statutory factor, 
the commission is then in a position to determine the relevance 
of those facts under that factor and decide if the factor is to 
be considered. 
The first error committed by the Board was in not ana-
lyzing each factor. The statute is unequivocally clear as to 
this requirement. The Board's Decision is invalid for failing to 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1981). 
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fo l low s ta tu tory procedure in determining the employee s t a t u s of 
5 
the demonstrators. 
Without any s tatutory authority or guidance, the Board 
dismissed as inappl icable at l eas t nine f a c t o r s . While the 
Board c e r t a i n l y has the l a t i t u d e to consider a given factor as 
not app l i cab le , i t may do so only af ter i t has made an ana lys i s 
(a study) of a l l the fac t s underlying that fac tor . The record i s 
c l e a r l y devoid of any such a n a l y s i s , or even any reference that 
such an ana lys i s was made. On the contrary, the Board merely 
recognized the ex i s t ence of the 20 f a c t o r s , and then made only 
cursory or conclusory statements , if any, concerning many of 
those f a c t o r s . There was cer ta in ly no review of the appl icable 
f a c t s underlying many of the factors or the ir impact on the 
common-law r e l a t i o n s h i p to the employer-employee r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
Contrary to the s t a t u t e , the Board f i r s t decided 
whether a given factor appeared re levant . If that factor 
b
 It i s equally clear that the original declaratory ruling by the Depart-
ment i s invalid for this same reason, yet the ALJ and the Board refused to 
correct this error. Mr. Levanger tes t i f ied that his determination was based 
on the questionnaires he had reviewed. R. 246. He also tes t i f i ed that the 
declaratory ruling letter sufficiently set forth the requisite analysis . R. 
248. Clearly, the questionnaires do not provide sufficient facts to analyze 
each factor. Moreover, absent from the declaratory ruling i s an analysis of 
each factor. Thus, the original ruling was improper and invalid and should 
have been overturned. 
6
 Factors C, F, H, I , Mf N, 0, P and Q. R. 404-405. Moreover, because 
the Board impermissibly categorized the factors and fai led to analyze each 
factor separately, i t i s d i f f icul t to t e l l whether other factors were likewise 
disregarded. 
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appeared irrelevant, the Board did not analyze the underlying 
facts as they related to that factor. The Board cannot consider 
the applicability of a given factor without first analyzing the 
facts underlying that factor. For this reason the Board erred 
which resulted in the incorrect conclusion that the demonstrators 
are not independent contractors. 
The Board has acted in contradiction to the plain lan-
guage of Section 35-4-22(j)(5) and thus has exceeded its statu-
tory authority in rendering its Decision. This was the conclu-
sion reached by the Supreme Court in a recent case involving an 
interpretation by an administrative agency of a similar statute. 
In Williams v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 763 P.2d 796 (Utah 
1988), the Supreme Court reviewed the Public Service Commission's 
("PSC") interpretation of Utah Code Ann. S 54-8b-3(2) (1986) 
which provides in part: 
In determining whether to exempt any telecom-
munications corporation or public telecommu-
nications service from any requirement of 
this title, the commission shall consider all 
relevant factors including, but not limited 
to: [Factors (a) through (k) omitted]. 
In Williams, the PSC claimed that the requirements of 
Section 54-8b-3(2) are satisfied "when the PSC merely considers 
whether one or more of the named factors [factors (a) through 
(k)] are relevant to an issue before it or when the PSC deter-
mines that presentation of evidence regarding a specific statu-
tory factor is, in its own view, unnecessary." Williams at 798. 
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The Respondent, Mountain States Tel. and Tel., attempted to jus-
tify PCS's action of not considering all the factors (a) through 
(k) by stating that Section 54-8b-3(2) should be interpreted to 
permit PSC to first consider a factor for its relevancy and if 
that factor is deemed irrelevant, to then not analyze the under-
lying facts or receive evidence as to that factor. Jk|. 
The Supreme Court rejected both the PSC's and the 
Respondent's, Mountain States Tel. and Tel., reasonings conclud-
ing that it "is unreasonable in that it is contrary to the plain 
language of the statute." id. at 799. 
The PSC may not arbitrarily disregard legis-
lative provisions at it convenience, just as 
it may not rewrite the statutory requirements 
of section 54-8b-3(2) by declaring "irrele-
vant" those factors which the legislature 
expressly deems relevant and instructs the 
PSC to at least consider. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
Section 35-4-22(j)(5) contains the same legislative 
mandate as Section 54-8b-3(2) but stated in a different form. It 
specifically states that all the factors must be analyzed and 
once analyzed, a factor may then be considered according to its 
relevancy. Equally so, in Williams the Supreme Court found that 
Section 54-8b-3(2) required the PSC to first consider (analyze) 
factors (a) through (k), and then the PSC was free to weigh those 
factors in its final decision. The Supreme Court specifically 
rejected the Respondent's argument that the PSC could first con-
sider the relevancy of a factor, and then ignore the factual 
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analysis of irrelevant factors. It is important to realize that 
the Supreme Court struck down PSC's determination, not because it 
was substantively incorrect in excluding factors which proved to 
be irrelevant, but for failing to analyze the factor first, and 
then exclude it from its final decision as being irrelevant. In 
Tasters' case, the Board's Decision is likewise procedurally 
invalid. 
B. The Board of Review, Without Statutory 
Authority, Classified the 20 Factors Into 
Four Categories. 
The Board improperly categorized the 20 factors under 
the statute by arbitrarily classifying them into four categories. 
R. 404-405. The Board then based its Decision on whether a group 
of factors indicates an employee or independent contractor sta-
tus. No where does the statute authorize or give the Board the 
discretion to classify the factors into categories. No where 
does the statute indicate that a final determination may be made 
based on whether certain factors as a group indicate a certain 
status. In fact, by classifying factors into categories, it is 
impossible to ascertain if each factor was appropriately ana-
7 
lyzed, and whether or not it was considered to be applicable. 
7
 In First National Bank of Boston v. County Board of Equalization, 145 
Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (No. 890278, October 16, 1990), the Supreme Court overturned 
a decision by the Utah Tax Commission because "it is unclear from the record 
how the Tax Commission arrived at figures it used in calculating the fair 
market value of petitioner's property." Id. at 9. 
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Such action by the Board falls outside its legislative authority 
to interpret this statute and therefore its Decision is invalid. 
Moreover, in using four categories of factors to render 
its Decision, the Board has relied on additional factors outside 
those set forth in the statute. In fact, two of the categories 
Q 
appear to follow the old AB test. In its Decision, the Board 
stated that "S 35-4-22(j)(5)fs two-part test of freedom from con-
trol and direction and independent establishment in business was 
replaced by a 20-part test focusing on control and direction." 
R. 404. Notwithstanding this statement, the Board creates four 
categories, the first two of which related to "the amount of 
direct control exercised over the individual" and "the degree of 
independence and separation." R. 404. These two categories are 
substantively the same as the old AB test. The Board goes on to 
create two other categories relating to "continuing personal 
relationship between the employer and employee" and "investment 
in equipment and allocation of expenses." R. 405. By using 
these categories to determine the status of the demonstrators, 
the Board has gone outside of the permissible scope of its statu-
tory authority. Clearly absent from the statute is any direction 
or authorization to first categorize the factors, and then ana-
lyze and weigh those factors in their respective categories. 
8
 See Appendix D for the text of prior law under Section 35-4-22(j)(5) 
(1988) referred to as the AB test. 
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C. The Board of Review Improperly Weighted the Factors. 
Finally, the Board erred in finding certain factors to 
be "significant," and given more weight then others. The statute 
provides no authority for weighting one relevant factor more than 
9 
another. The statute provides "an individual is an independent 
contractor if the weight of the evidence supports that finding." 
The factors should individually bear equal weight. To weight 
factors, or find some "significant," is legislating new guide-
lines or standards in the statute. The Legislature obviously 
considered all 20 factors to be significant as the statute 
requires all 20 factors to be analyzed. As the Supreme Court 
held in Williams, supra, all factors must be analyzed. Moreover, 
no one knows what is "significant" or what weight attaches to a 
significant factor. 
The Board has erred in its interpretation of the appli-
cable review under Section 35-4-22(j)(5) and has impermissibly 
adopted new standards without any legislative authority. Accord-
ing its Decision should be reversed. 
II. THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 
35-4-22(j)(5) TO TASTERS. 
The Board erred, and Tasters has been substantially 
prejudiced thereby, in applying the 20 factors under Section 
9
 The Board erroneously concluded in its Decision that "S 35-4-22(j)(5) 
further recognizes the necessity of 'weighing* factors according to their 
significance under the facts of a particular case." R. 404. 
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35-4-22( j) (5) to the facts of this case. Most blatant of these 
errors, and the most prejudicial to Tasters, is that almost half 
of the factors set forth in the statute (and possibly more) were 
summarily disregarded as being "of little significance" or "not 
useful under the circumstances of this case." R. 404-405. Con-
trary to the statutory requirement that all factors are required 
to be analyzed, and without any findings, discussion or conclu-
sions as to the facts underlying these factors, the Board ignores 
various factors to support a conclusion that the demonstrators 
are employees of Tasters. 
The most troubling fact behind the Board's exclusion of 
these factors is that these factors are the ones which show that 
the demonstrators are free from the control of Tasters and should 
be treated as independent contractors. The Board arbitrarily 
declares these factors "not useful" in order to avoid a finding 
of independent contractor status by concluding that "due to the 
unique nature of Taster's business, the Board considers many of 
the factors in this category to be of little significance." R. 
404. 
This conclusion as to the nature of Taster's business 
demonstrates the Board's improper application of the statute. 
The Board ignores the very issue of this case; i.e., what is the 
nature of Taster's business in relation to the control of the 
demonstrators. The very factors the Board excludes because of 
the "unique nature of Tasters' business" are those that show that 
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Tasters does not exercise control over the demonstrators. With-
out any justification or rationale, the Board has arbitrarily 
ignored these factors. 
For example, in what the Board classifies as the second 
category, it excluded six factors (C, F, H, 0, P and Q). In two 
sentences the Board provides its explanation for this exclusion, 
"For example, Taster's business does not require full-time 
employees or a high degree of contact with its demonstrators. 
Nor does it require or permit a substantial investment in equip-
ment." R. 404. The fact the demonstrators are part-time and not 
required to devote full time to Tasters is a very relevant fact 
which indicates independent contractor status. In fact, this is 
a specific test or factor that is required to be analyzed, but 
the Board summarily disregarded it. Factor H sets forth (empha-
sis added): 
(H) whether the individual is free to work 
when and for whom he or she chooses, or is 
required to devote full-time to the business 
of the employer, and is restricted from doing 
other gainful work. 
The record is clear and uncontroverted. The demonstra-
tions are free to work when and for whom they choose. R. 219, 
222. They are not required to devote full-time to Tasters, and 
are not restricted from doing other work. R. 219. Many demon-
strators have worked for other agencies, or currently do work for 
others. R. 230. Cohn testified she knew some worked for others 
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and did not care . R. 219. Moreover, some demonstrators 
d i r e c t l y compete with Tasters by contacting and working d i r e c t l y 
for the manufacturers. 
This factor H c l e a r l y shows that the demonstrators are 
independent contractors and not employees. To exclude t h i s fac -
tor because of the unique nature of Tasters business ignores the 
very i s sue and the obvious fac t s of t h i s case . Such a conclusion 
i s arbi trary and unsupported. 
The Board a l so excluded factor 0 which s e t s forth: 
(0) whether the individual has a r e a l , 
e s s e n t i a l , and adequate investment in the 
business or has a lack of investment and 
depends on the employer for such f a c i l i t i e s . 
The demonstrators do have a r e a l , e s s e n t i a l and ade-
quate investment in the ir bus iness . There i s no quest ion 
1 0
 Sandra Cohn ("Cohn") i s the president of Tasters and tes t i f i ed on behalf 
of Tasters at the appeals hearing. Beverly Nelson ("Nelson"), Eve Baird 
("Baird"), Pat Colmere ("Colmere"), Mabel Hegerhorst ("Hegerhorst") and Elaine 
Belrose ("Belrose") are demonstrators who tes t i f i ed at the appeals hearing. 
R. 137. 
11 
DOCTORMAN: 
COHN: 
DOCTORMAN: 
COHN: 
R. 2 1 9 . 
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Do you care whether or not they work for other demonstra-
tion companies? 
Not at a l l . I feel they're truly independent 
contractors. 
If they were to directly contact a manufacturer and work 
directly for some manufacturers and then also work for 
Tasters? Would that bother you? 
They do a l l the time. 
that the demonstrators are required to purchase and provide their 
own equipment. R. 153, 229. Thus there is a real investment in 
the business. Without this equipment they could not perform 
their demonstration services. Thus there is an essential invest-
ment in the business. Finally, the percentage cost of this 
equipment in comparison to total revenue generated makes this 
investment adequate. The testimony shows that a demonstrator 
would pay approximately $50-$200 for a table, frying pan, crock 
pot, tablecloths, aprons, etc. R. 153, 229. Demonstrators treat 
and account for these expenditures as business costs. Colmere 
testified that she accounts for all of these costs and deducts 
them as a business cost and does not use them at home. R. 188. 
Remembering that approximately 92% of demonstrators who did work 
with Tasters made less than $600 per year, then a cost outlay of 
$200 for total revenues of under $600, leads to a capital invest-
ment of approximately 33%. Thus the demonstrators have a real 
12 
and substantial investment. 
Moreover, the other half of factor 0 likewise indicates 
the demonstrators are not employees. This second portion 
requires that the individual "has a lack of investment and 
depends on the employer for such facilities." (Emphasis added). 
12
 Cohn testified that out of approximately 2,000 employees, Tasters sent 
out 160 IRS Form 1099. R. 246. I.R.C. S 6041 requires a Form 1099 to be 
completed for any individual to whom annual payments are made exceeding $600 
or more. 
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The Board is quick to conclude, erroneously as explained above, 
that the demonstrators lack investment, but conveniently ignores 
the second portion of this factor which is that the individual 
depends on the employer for such facilities. Once again the 
record is clear and uncontroverted. Tasters supplies no equip-
ment nor facilities to demonstrators. R. 224. On one occasion 
microwaves were provided to the demonstrators by the manufac-
turer, not Tasters. R. 224. Tasters provides no office space 
for demonstrators. R. 232. The demonstrators clearly do not 
depend on Tasters for facilities. 
The Board's failure to properly construe the record and 
apply the statute is apparent. Crucial facts and circumstances 
which go the the essence of Tasters business relationship with 
demonstrators were misconstrued or ignored altogether. Absent 
from the Board's Decision is any reference or discussion given to 
the other second category factors C, F, P, Q. Yet in its conclu-
sion, the Board states that it has evaluated the 20 factors and 
states "[i]n light of the facts of this case, both categories 
[referring to categories 1 and 2] indicate that the employment 
relationship between Tasters and its demonstrators is that of 
employer and employees." R. 405. The apparent inference is that 
it has reviewed the seven factors it grouped into category 2 to 
reach its decision when the Board did nothing more than recite 
their designation as C, F, H, 0, P, and Q and then summarily dis-
regard their impact. Factor R was the only factor it analyzed 
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and considered before ruling that the entire category indicated 
employee status. 
The Board commits this same error with respect to its 
fourth category and factors I, M and N. A nominal review of 
these factors discloses relevant inquires which must be analyzed 
and then considered. Factor I asks if the individual "is physi-
cally within the employer's direction and supervision." Lengthy 
testimony was given that Tasters does not evaluate, supervise or 
direct any of the demonstrators activities. R. 151, 215, 216. 
Demonstrators are free to perform their demonstrations at their 
own pace, using their own discretion as to how to perform a dem-
onstration. R. 190, 217. The Board has arbitrarily dismissed 
the relevance of this factor because it indicates independent 
contract status. 
Factor M is likewise relevant as the record shows that 
the demonstrator is personally responsible for all costs (equip-
ment, gas, mileage, etc.) except for incidental supplies used at 
the demonstration which are paid by the broker and not Tasters. 
R. 193, 228. The Board improperly ignored this factor. 
Finally, factor N likewise focuses on the extent of 
control over an individual's work by focusing on whether the 
employer furnishes equipment. Once again the record is clear 
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that Tasters furnishes no equipment. R. 224. Once again, the 
13 Board improperly excluded this factor from consideration. 
To further highlight the errors committed by the Board 
would only be redundant and the restricted length of this brief 
does not permit further delineation. However, in section IV, 
infra. Tasters discusses the appropriate analysis and consider-
ation of the facts of this case under the 20 factors. 
III. THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN MAKING OR FAIL-
ING TO MAKE CERTAIN FINDINGS OF FACT. 
The principal error committed by the Board in its find-
ings of fact was not the findings it made, but rather its failure 
to recognize and identify the many facts set forth in the record 
which clearly indicate the demonstrators are independent contrac-
tors. Set forth in Appendix E is a list of the findings of facts 
relevant to this proceeding which the Board failed to make from 
the record. Tasters' statement of facts, set forth above, shows 
the uncontroverted record in this matter to support these find-
ings of fact. Tasters asserts this Court should review the 
13
 As mentioned in footnote 7, supra, the Supreme Court recently stated 
that an administrative agency does not have "the unbridled discretion to make 
findings of fact beyond the scope of what is presented in the hearings or 
inferences to be drawn therefrom/1 First National Bank of Boston at 9. In 
First Nationaly the Supreme Court reversed the Tax Comnission's decision 
because it ignored the evidence set forth in the record. 
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record and make findings of fact substantially in the form of 
14 those set forth in Appendix E. 
As to those findings set forth in its Decision, further 
comment is warranted. While Tasters provides each demonstrator a 
two-page set of written instructions, these instructions are not 
as detailed and mandatory as the Board's statement would lead one 
to believe. For example, the Board finds that these instructions 
"govern the performance their duties, including details such as 
attire, length of breaks, product display, and demonstration tac-
tics. " R. 402. As Cohen testified and as is apparent from a 
cursory review (see Appendix C), these instructions were intended 
as general guidelines and instructions, not mandatory require-
ments. R. 216-7. For example, as to attire, the instructions 
provide: "Dress appropriately. Look Professional. Please wear 
an APRON!" Other than the request to wear an apron (which is 
common sense given the fact that demonstrators work primarily 
with food), the demonstrator is free to wear what he or she 
chooses. As to product display, the instructions provide: "3. 
Always set a beautiful table and use a neat tablecloth." As to 
14
 Because of the ALJ's multiple roles vis-a-vis fact-finding, prosecution 
and adjudication in establishing the underlying record, the Court should 
review the record de novo. See Hurley and Pickering supra. In any event, at 
the very least, this Court must review the whole record and "must 
consider. . . the evidence that 'fairly detracts from the weight of the 
[Board's 3 evidence.'" Grace Drilling at 68 (emphasis added, footnote 
omitted). 
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demonstration tactics, the instructions provide: "11. SMILE!!! 
Have fun and be creative." 
These guidelines are hardly a detailed set of required 
procedures or requirements setting norms of operating procedure 
which must be followed. They are nothing more than what they 
were intended to be, general guidelines and suggestions. R. 216, 
232. 
While it is true when a demonstrator accepts a specific 
job, certain hours are set, the demonstrator was not required to 
work that schedule, but is free to change or alter that schedule 
after consultation with a store owner. R. 214, 223. Moreover, 
as to breaks or lunch, a demonstrator is free to take those as 
they desire, if at all. R. 152, 173. Finally, its not Tasters 
who sets that schedule, but the grocery store or broker. R. 145, 
214. 
As with the instructions, the final report prepared by 
the demonstrators is no more than a confirmation of work per-
formed with feed back on the demonstration. R. 210. These 
reports are for the benefit of the brokers, not Tasters, and many 
times prepared by the brokers. R. 226-7. These reports are not 
compiled for review or evaluation of the demonstrators. In fact 
these reports contain such cursory questions such as "Weather 
Conditions: Clear & Sunny Overcast Rain Snow 
." See Appendix F hereto containing the one page report. 
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This Court should review the record de novo. As set 
forth in this Argument, and as described elsewhere in this Brief, 
the Board failed to make findings of fact that clearly support 
independent contractor status. This Court should make findings 
of fact substantially in the form of those set forth in Appendix 
E. 
IV. THE UNCOMTROVERTED EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT DEMON-
STRATORS ARE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. 
As required by Section 35-4-22(j)(5), Tasters has ana-
lyzed all the facts in subsections (A) through (T) as set forth 
below. The weight of this evidence shows that the demonstrators 
are independent contractors. 
Factor A. The evidence supports a finding that the 
demonstrators are entitled to choose their schedule of when, 
where and how their work is to be performed. Factor A is very 
specific. To conclude that this factor indicates employee sta-
tus, the individual must be "required to comply with another per-
son's instructions." (Emphasis added). It is very clear that 
demonstrators are free, without repercussion, accept or decline 
any work. R. 144-5. If a demonstrator decides not to accept the 
work because they do not like the time or place, they simply may 
turn it down without repercussion. R. 151, 190. Nelson agreed 
that she effectively selected the time and place of where she 
worked. R. 151. Colmere does not take any job that does not 
meet her satisfaction. R. 189. 
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Although demonstrations must be done in a store, demon-
strators are free to accept or turn down where a demonstration is 
to be performed. R. 151. In fact, some demonstrators choose to 
work in multiple cities. R. 222, 223. Other demonstrators work 
only in one location. R. 222. Some will only work a given trade 
show or a specific type of demonstration. R. 221-2. 
Additionally, it is clear that demonstrators determine 
how the work is to be performed. R. 151, 203, 204, 216. The 
repeated testimony is that the demonstrators do what they feel is 
best for any given demonstration. Tasters does not attempt to 
control or direct the demonstrators on how to conduct a demon-
stration. R. 215. While Tasters gives suggestions and guide-
lines to the demonstrators, this falls significantly short of 
"requiring" a specific conduct as contemplated by the statute. 
It is clear the demonstrator controls what they want to do. 
Therefore, Factor A indicates independent contractor status. 
Factor B. For this factor to indicate employee status 
there must be a finding that the demonstrator "[(1)] is trained 
by an experienced employee working with [the demonstrator], [(2)] 
is required to take correspondence or other courses, attend meet-
ings, and [(3)] by other methods indicates that the employer 
wants the services performed." (Emphasis added). The evidence 
clearly shows that none of these requirements are met. There is 
no training by an experienced employee of Tasters working with 
the demonstrators. R. 218. The occasional training session 
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arranged at the broker's request is usually conducted by the bro-
ker, not Tasters. R. 216. Attendance at these, or any other 
meetings, is not required and there are no correspondence 
courses. R. 182, 218. In any event, the evidence further sup-
ports a finding that the demonstrators use their own methods and 
require no specific training to perform the demonstration. R. 
148, 151, 152, 159, 101, 102, 185, 186, 190. 15 
1 5
 The most persuasive evidence was from Colmere as follows: 
JUDGE: Could you decline to go to the meeting if you desires to? 
COLMERE: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. If I didn't want to do that product I 
didn't have to go to the meeting nor to the 
demonstration. 
JUDGE: Well, let's say, for instance, you wanted to do one prod-
uct — 
COLMERE: Okay,. 
JUDGE: — but do not want to attend the meeting. 
COLMERE: Oh, you don't have to attend the meeting. 
JUDGE: So, you could do the demonstration without — 
COLMERE: Right. 
R. 181-2. Likewise Nelson testified: 
DOCTORMAN: Did Tasters ever tell you specifically how to perform the 
details of your demonstration or were the details left to 
you to determine? 
NIELSEN: The details were left to me to determine. 
DOCTORMAN: You never attended any training session in Salt Lake put 
on by Tasters? Is that correct? 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The testimony of the demonstrators was confirmed with 
the testimony of Tasters. Tasters does not review the perfor-
mance of the demonstrators. R. 209. Tasters does not require 
demonstrators to attend meetings. R. 213. The demonstrators 
determine the details of their work. R. 215. Tasters does not 
supervise the work. R. 216. There is no critique or performance 
review of the work. R. 216. The demonstrator determines the 
results. R. 217. 
It is clear from the testimony of both the demonstra-
tors and from Tasters that the demonstrator (1) uses his or her 
own methods; (2) is not trained by an experienced employee; 
(3) is not required to take correspondence courses or attend 
meetings; and (4) there are no other methods that indicate that 
Tasters determined how the services are performed. Therefore, 
Factor B indicates independent contractor status. 
Factor C. To find that this factor weighs in favor of 
employee status, it must be shown that Tasters' success and con-
tinuation of its business depends on the demonstrators' services 
and Tasters coordinates work with the work of others. This fac-
tor focuses on whether there is any special technical expertise 
vital to Tasters' business which Tasters is coordinating and 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
NIELSEN: That's right. 
R. 151f 152. 
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integrating with the work of others for an end result. The real 
business involved here is a marketing effort by brokers (manufac-
turers) to sell products. While the success of Tasters' business 
may be indirectly affected by the demonstrators, the real factor 
is the brokers' (manufacturers') desire or budget to market a new 
product. If there is no budget, there will be no demonstrations 
despite the ability of a demonstrator to promote a product. 
Thus, the success or continuation of Tasters business does not 
depend on the demonstrators. Nor does Tasters integrate the work 
of one demonstrator with another to reach an end result. This 
factor indicates independent contractor status. 
Factor D. The evidence supports a finding that the 
demonstrator's services "may," and in fact have been, assigned to 
others and are not required to be rendered personally. Factor D 
only requires that the demonstrators have the right to assign 
services to others and does not require that assignments actually 
have taken place as suggested by the Administrative Law Judge and 
the Department's questionnaire. There is clearly no prohibition 
against assignment of the services to others as testified by 
Nelson (R. 152), Baird (R. 170), Colmere (R. 191, 196) and 
Hegerhorst (R. 199), and even Tasters so testified. R. 218-9. 
Even the Administrative Law Judge agrees that at least "one indi-
vidual in Price" assigns services. R. 336. Therefore, as the 
Board concluded. Factor D indicates independent contractor sta-
tus. R. 405. 
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Factor E. The e v i d e n c e suppor t s a f i n d i n g t h a t the 
d e m o n s t r a t o r s have the r i g h t t o h i r e f s u p e r v i s e and pay a s s i s -
t a n c e pursuant t o a c o n t r a c t under which the demonstrator i s 
r e s p o n s i b l e o n l y for the a t ta inment of a r e s u l t . There i s no 
d i s c r e t i o n e x e r c i s e d by T a s t e r s as t o whom the demonstra tors h i r e 
or s u p e r v i s e and how they pay them. Ne l son t e s t i f i e d t h a t T a s t -
e r s never t o l d her t h a t she cou ld not h i r e an a s s i s t a n t . R. 1 5 2 . 
Colmere t e s t i f i e d t h a t i f she cou ld not complete a job and h i r e d 
an a s s i s t a n t t o complete the j o b , she would pay the a s s i s t a n t . 
The s t a t u t e i s c l e a r t h a t the t e s t i s whether the i n d i -
v i d u a l has t h e r i g h t t o e x e r c i s e the power, not whether the 
J-o JUDGE: All right. One follow-up question. Uh, i f you called a 
substitute and a substitute finished your shi f t , who 
would pay the substitute? 
COLMERE: I w o u l d . 
R. 196. Cohn likewise t e s t i f i ed: 
DOCTORMAN: May a demonstrator's services be assigned to others? 
COHN: It happens a l l the time. 
DOCTORMAN: Does Tasters have any objection that there was a middle-
man involved for the work performed? 
COHN: Well, no, because I think i t happens a l o t . . • • 
DOCTORMAN: Then i s i t correct to say that a demonstrator has the 
right to hire, supervise and pay other assistants? 
COHN: Yes, and they do. 
R. 218-9 . 
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individual did in fact exercise the power. The record clearly 
shows that demonstrators had, and exercised, this right. There 
was no testimony to the contrary. Therefore, Factor E indicates 
independent contractor status. 
Factor F. The record shows that demonstrators work on 
a job by job basis. R. 221-2. The demonstrator is paid by the 
job. R. 204. The demonstration fee is negotiated depending on 
the job. R. 207. While the demonstrator may perform various 
demonstrations, this does not establish continuous work from 
"year to year" which would indicate employee status. The demon-
strator's relation to Tasters is the same as an electrician or 
plumber to a general contractor who favors their work and contin-
ually calls them for work. The focal point is that once the 
requested job is completed, there is no continuous on-going busi-
ness relationship until the next job is hired out. 
The record shows there is no continuous relationship. 
As approximately 92% of the demonstrators earned less then $600, 
simple arithmetic shows these demonstrators conducted, on an 
average, only 8.5 jobs a year (based on a 2-day $70 demonstra-
tion). Moreover, this assumes a demonstrator earned a full $600. 
The number of demonstrations would be proportionately less for 
those earning under $600. The record shows the demonstrators are 
hired to do a single job and have no further legal obligation to 
perform additional services until hired to do another job. 
Factor F indicates independent contractor status. 
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Factor G. The evidence supports a finding that a dem-
onstrator establishes his or her own time schedule and not Tast-
ers. Cohn testified that the demonstrators set their own sched-
17 
ule as to when they will work. Hegerhorst testified that she 
can work when and where she wants. R. 201. This testimony is 
similar to the testimony of Nelson who testified that she is free 
DOCTORMAN: Now as I understand it, Vi Colmere works in Salt Lake 
City, Bullhead City and Tucson? 
COHN: Uh-huh. 
DOCTORMAN: As — her travel schedule determines? 
COHN: Right. And she tells us when. We don't pay for her 
travel. We don't pay for her phone calls. Its what she 
likes to do. 
DOCTORMAN: She works — when she wants to work? 
COHN: Right. 
DOCTORMAN: Okay. Can the demonstrator establish their own time 
schedule? 
COHN: Yeah. Many times they do. If they want to leave early 
because they have an engagement, they tell the store 
manager, "I'm coming in from 10 to 6" even if we've said 
its from 11 to 7; and if its okay with him its fine with 
us. Most of the time we don't know all those things that 
are going on. . . . 
DOCTORMAN: Is the demonstrator free to work when and for whom he or 
she chooses? 
COHN: Oh, yes. 
R. 223. 
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to accept or decline offers without repercussion. Further, 
Nelson indicated that Tasters did not tell her when to take a 
lunch or break, that Tasters did not monitor breaks or lunch, and 
she did not have to report to Tasters if she had to leave the 
store for personal reasons or for an emergency. R. 152. 
There is no requirement that a demonstrator work at a 
time or place that is not selected by the demonstrator. There is 
no evidence that Tasters selects the time schedule. In fact, 
Cohn testified that Tasters does not set the time schedule, 
rather the broker or store. R. 214. The only apparent con-
straint on the time is that the demonstration must be performed 
at a time when the stores have a large volume of shoppers which 
factor varies from store to store and is not determined by Tast-
ers. Factor G indicates independent contractor status. 
18 
DOCTORMAN: And if Tasters asked you to perform a demonstration at a 
time that was inconvenient to you and you did not want to 
perform it at that time, would you feel free to turn that 
down? 
NELSEN: Yes. 
DOCTORMAN: And would there be any repercussions for, ah, that? 
NELSEN: No, there weren't any. 
DOCTORMAN: So, effectively, you could set the time and place with 
which you wanted to work by either accepting or reject-
ing, uh, available demonstrations. Is that correct? 
NELSEN: Yes. 
R. 151. 
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Factor H. See pp. 21-23, supra, for analysis and dis-
cussion of factor (H). 
Factor I. The evidence supports a finding that the 
demonstrators use their own phones, equipment and work out of 
their homes, and are not physically within Tasters' direction and 
control. The demonstrators pay for their own phone bills. 
R. 223. It is clear demonstrators use their own equipment. R. 
148, 166, 182. Tasters does not provide any services or pay for 
any of the overhead in connection with the services for the dem-
onstrators. R. 232. Tasters does not provide office space for 
demonstrators. R. 232. It is further clear that the demonstra-
tors are not physically within Tasters' direction and supervi-
sion. Nelson testified that Tasters does not monitor her. 
R. 152. Hegerhorst testified that there are no written evalua-
tions. R. 199. Colmere testified there was no physical 
supervision. 
19 
DOCTORMAN: Okay. Does Tasters physically supervise you with someone 
on the premises where you work? 
COLMERE: No. 
DOCTORMAN: Do they do any written evaluations of your work? 
COLMERE: I wouldn't know. 
DOCTORMAN: They haven't given them to you? 
COLMERE: No. 
R. 192. 
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However, the most compelling evidence that the demon-
strators are not physically within the employer's direction and 
supervision is the fact that Tasters has only two full time and 
three part time employed office staff and Tasters arranges demon-
strations with 2,000 demonstrators. R. 207. It would be physi-
cally impossible for two full time and three part time employees 
to physically supervise 2,000 demonstrators. 
Tasters does not perform any performance reviews. 
R. 225. Tasters does not reward exceptional performances with 
monetary bonuses. R. 225-6. Tasters does not discipline mar-
ginal performance. R. 226. The successor or failure of a demon-
stration is not graded in any way. R. 226. Therefore, Factor I 
indicates independent contractor status. 
Factor J. The evidence supports a finding that the 
demonstrators are free to perform demonstration services at their 
own pace and that the order or sequence is not determined by 
20 Tasters. Tasters does not control the order of sequence of a 
20
 Belrose testified as follows: 
DOCTQRMAN: When you are in the store performing your demonstration, 
can you perform your demonstration at your own pace, 
meaning, when I talk about pace, the amount of people you 
contact, the amount of product that you display or the 
specific requirements set forth on your pace by Tasters? 
BELROSE: My own pace. 
R. 205. 
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demonstration. Factor J indicates independent contractor 
status. 
Factor K. The evidence supports a finding that the 
demonstrator's report is only an invoice to Tasters for payment 
and any detail in the report is for the benefit of the manufac-
turer and not Tasters. The demonstrators submit a one page sum-
mary report to Tasters only to report that the work was per-
formed. R. 227. Any detail that is included in the report is 
for the use of the manufacturers not for Tasters. R. 226-7. 
21 
DOCTORMAN: Does Tasters set forth the order of sequence in which the 
demonstrators are to perform their service? 
COHN: No. 
DOCTORMAN: Who sets that now? 
COHN: Our client or the store, because even if the client tells 
them something, they could go to the store and the 
department manager could tell them something else. 
DOCTORMAN: Does the demonstrator have any say in the order or 
sequence in which they perform their demonstration? 
COHN: I would say they have the most control; because she sets 
it up and does it and then generally that's how it works. 
Ah, the manager makes a suggestion that she might change 
or she might not. 
DOCTORMAN: If there's a problem that arises during the demonstra-
tion, who's primarily responsible to solve that problem? 
COHN: The demonstrator. 
R. 224, 225. 
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Tasters as the middleman merely sends it on to the manufacturer 
and keeps a copy in case the manufacturer loses it. R. 209. 
Moreover, the report is not used for any evaluation or perfor-
mance review of the demonstrator. The report is to provide feed-
back to the manufacturer. R. 226-7. Thus, the demonstrators do 
not provide a report to Tasters, but to the manufacturer. There-
fore, Factor K indicates independent contractor status. 
Factor L. The evidence supports a finding that demon-
strators are paid by the job. Belrose, Colmere, and Cohn all 
testified that demonstrators are paid a lump sum for each demon-
stration. R. 180, 204, 209. If a demonstrator only completed a 
portion of a job, that demonstrator would not be paid an hourly 
wage for the hours she worked, the job must be completed before 
payment is made. R. 231. Moreover, payment is not made at 
stated intervals in regular amounts as ordinary salary or wages 
are typically paid. R. 227-8. Therefore, Factor L indicates 
independent contractor status. 
Factor M. The evidence supports a finding that demon-
strators account for their own expenses and Tasters does not pay 
expenses. The cost of equipment, gas, mileage, day care, etc., 
are all borne by the demonstrator. R. 172, 223, 232. While inci-
dental demonstration expenses are reimbursed, these expenses are 
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not paid by Tasters. In fact, some demonstrators don't even 
bother to send in an invoice for their supplies. R. 229. There-
fore, Factor M indicates independent contractor status. 
Factor N. The evidence supports a finding that the 
demonstrators clearly provide their own tools and equipment for 
the performance of the demonstration. Nelson testified that 
Tasters did not provide anything. R. 148. Baird testified she 
provided her own equipment. R. 166. It is clear that the demon-
strators provide their own equipment. R. 221. There were only 
two pieces of equipment not supplied by the demonstrator. This 
was the occasional use of a microwave oven or pizza oven. In 
22 
DOCTORMAN: When ah# you submit your expense vouchers to Tasters, do 
you know whether or not Tasters is paying the expense 
vouchers or whether or not the food broker is actually 
paying your expenses? 
COLMERE: The food broker is paying the expenses. 
DOCTORMAN: How do you know that? 
COLMERE: I — I — I figure that the — the — like the tooth-
picks, napkins, paper towels or whatever, when I purchase 
them with my own money, send the receipt in with my 
factsheet, that the factsheet and receipt is then sent to 
the broker and he reimburses me for the — the product 
and the — and what I have purchased to bring that 
product, across. 
DOCTORMAN: Okay. So Tasters is still the middleman? 
COLMERE: That's ah — that's — I — Tasters is not my boss. 
R. 193. 
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both cases, neither Tasters nor the demonstrator paid for this 
piece of equipment but it was paid for by the manufacturers, 
R. 224. Factor N indicates independent contractor status. 
Factor 0. See pages 23-25 for a analysis and discus-
sion of factor 0. 
Factor P. The evidence supports a finding that an 
individual may realize a profit or suffer a loss as a result of 
the service performed. Colmere testified that if her equipment 
was damaged or if she hurt someone, that all those expenses would 
23 be her own. There is no doubt that a demonstrator may suffer a 
loss as a result of the service performed. That loss may be a 
loss to their equipment or a loss as a result of their actions. 
In one case, a demonstrator had to pay a plumber to fix a sink 
she damaged in a grocery store. R. 230. Likewise, Cohn testi-
fied that Tasters does not and would not be responsible for 
23 
D0CT0RMAN: 
COLMERE: 
D0CT0RMAN: 
COLMERE: 
R. 194. 
If, ah, the equipment was lo — was damaged in a demon-
stration, say you'd dropped the frying pan or your card 
table like broke for some reasons, is — who's expense is 
that? 
Mine. 
Okay. If you were to negligently hurt somebody or damage 
something, say by spilling something on their clothing or 
burning them with some grease or ah something of that 
nature and it was determined that it was your fault, who 
should pay for that loss or damage? 
Me. 
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damages caused by demonstrators. R. 243-4. Therefore, Factor P 
indicates independent contractor status. 
Factor Q. The evidence supports a finding that the 
demonstrators work for a number of persons or firms at the same 
time they work for Tasters. Nelson worked for Dynamic Demos. 
R. 148. Colmere said she has the right to work for others. 
R. 192. Cohn testified that many of her demonstrators worked for 
multiple companies, including demonstration companies who were in 
direct competition with Tasters. R. 223. Many demonstrators 
have full time jobs as nurses, teachers and the like. R. 223. 
Therefore, Factor Q indicates independent contractor status. 
Factor R. To conclude that the demonstrators do not 
have an office, do not have a business phone, or do not advertise 
ignores the substance of the demonstrators' business and looks 
only to form. While the demonstrators do not rent space in a 
downtown office building, they do maintain an "office" in their 
home where they maintain their records, store their equipment and 
schedule demonstrations. Demonstrators do not advertise in news-
papers because the general public does not hire demonstrators. 
Rather demonstrators advertise their services to demonstration 
companies, like Tasters, primarily by phone. Cohn testified that 
approximately 80% of the jobs are filled by demonstrators tele-
phoning to solicit a job. R. 222. While this is not advertise-
ment in a newspaper, it certainly is advertisement. Finally, as 
discussed above, the demonstrators have a real interest and 
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financial stake in their business. Thus the second portion of 
factor R, indicating employee status, is not satisfied. 
Factor S. The record shows that the demonstrators are 
hired to do a given job. As long as the demonstration is com-
pleted, the demonstrator is paid in full. R. 231. In fact, 
Tasters does not fire anyone. Tasters merely removes inactive 
demonstrators who perform no work with Tasters from their list 
automatically by computer. R. 231. As each job represents a 
separate job, Tasters is compelled to pay the demonstrator for a 
job performed. Tasters may not summarily fire a demonstrator 
once a job has been assigned. Tasters could not stop a demon-
stration after the first three hours and "fire" the demonstrator 
without paying the full demonstration fee. In fact, Tasters 
would be liable to a demonstrator for contract damages if it 
attempted to do so. This factor indicates independent contractor 
status. 
Factor T. Just as Tasters is contractually bound to 
pay for a completed job, so to is a demonstrator bound to perform 
a demonstration once accepted. The agreement is to do a specific 
demonstration. The demonstrator is not free to walk out or not 
complete a demonstration if they are sick or have a conflict, but 
are responsible to find a substitute. Belrose testified that if 
she cannot complete a demonstration she gets someone to take her 
place. R. 204. If a demonstrator leaves a job after three 
hours, they are not entitled to three hours wages, the 
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demonstrator must complete the job to get paid. R. 210. The 
agreement is to perform an entire demonstration. This factor 
indicates independent contractor status. 
As section 35-4-22(j)(5) requires, Tasters has analyzed 
the underlying facts as they related to each of the 20 factors. 
Having made this mandatory analysis, Tasters can now consider the 
factors to determine if the weight of the evidence supports a 
conclusion of employee or independent contractor status. While 
based on the foregoing analysis, Tasters believes that all 20 
factors provide relevant evidence, indicative of independent con-
tractor status, Tasters concludes that a reasonable person could 
consider factors C, R, and S as not applicable. Nevertheless, 
the weight of evidence under the remaining 17 factors clearly and 
substantially favor a determination of independent contractor 
status. The contrary decision of the Board is incorrect and 
unsupported as the Board misapplied the statute and ignored the 
evidence set forth in the record, and similarly failed to 
explain, justify or support its conclusion from the record. 
According to First National Bank of Boston, supra, the Board's 
decision must be reversed and this Court should enter its Deci-
24 
sion that the demonstrators are independent contractors. 
24
 In Adele's Housekeeping, Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 757 P.2d 
480 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court ruled, under the old AB test, that house-
keepers were not employees of Adele's. While this case was decided under the 
old AB test, the underlying facts to that decision are significantly similar; 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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V. THE BOARD OF REVIEW FAILED TO GIVE SUFFICIENT 
WEIGHT TO THE PRIOR DETERMINATION MADE BY THE 
IRS THAT DEMONSTRATORS ARE INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTORS. 
Prior to its revision, Section 35-4-22(j)(5) provided a 
two factor test, referred to as the AB test, to determine 
employee-independent contractor status. The statute was revised 
to adopt 20 factors which are to be analyzed to determine 
employee-independent contractor status. The legislative history 
to this change sets forth that the old AB test "created somewhat 
of a hardship especially on small businesses" and therefore the 
Legislature revised the AB test "to adopt the IRS test as the 
. . 25 
d e f i n i t i o n of independent c o n t r a c t o r v e r s u s an employee ." 
As t h e l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y i n d i c a t e s , Utah has adopted 
and f o l l o w s t h e same 20 f a c t o r t e s t as a p p l i e d by t h e I . R . S . 
Thus, one would r e a s o n a b l y assume t h a t the s t a t e and I . R . S . would 
reach t h e same r e s u l t when app ly ing the same t e s t t o t h e same 
f a c t s . Th i s i s why the 20 f a c t o r t e s t was adopted , t o a v o i d hav-
ing t h e s m a l l b u s i n e s s e s bear the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e burdens of 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
i . e . , the housekeeper would agree with homeowners as to where, when, and how 
jobs should be done; Adele's would not inspect work; housekeepers had a mini-
mal investment in equipment which were ordinary household items; housekeepers 
paid lump sum for jobs, e tc . Adele's at 481. 
2 5
 See APPENDIX G for a transcript of Senate House Bi l l No. 164 contain-
ing the l eg i s la t ive history to Section 35-4-22(j)(5) . 
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accounting for two separate types of employment status. The 
Board likewise agrees that when applying the same test to the 
same facts, "it is probable that the same result will be 
reached." R. 406. 
Tasters recognizes that an I.R.S. determination is not 
binding on Utah courts but a prior determination by the I.R.S. 
using the same test, reviewing the same facts, is extremely 
evidentiary of what the proper determination should be. The 
I.R.S. has years of experience in administering this area and its 
determinations should be given substantial weight to corroborate 
the final decision being made. Accordingly, Tasters submits that 
the prior determination made by the I.R.S., that the demonstra-
tors are independent contractors, be considered for the relevant 
evidence it provides. To completely ignore this determination on 
the predicate that "[occasionally, differences in fact-finding 
will result in contrary decisions" (R. 406) is arbitrary and 
capricious. 
It is uncontroverted that the Internal Revenue Service 
ruled that demonstrators contracting with Tasters did not have an 
employer-employee relationship. Tasters responded to the Inter-
nal Revenue Service's request and completed and filed an IRS Form 
SS-8 which provides a detailed disclosure of the demonstrators' 
activities and relationships with Tasters. Tasters provided a 
working copy of this form to the Tribunal (R. 104-109) and also 
provided to the Tribunal correspondence to and from the Internal 
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Revenue Service who ultimately found after reviewing the Form 
SS-8 that an employer-employee relationship did not exist. See 
R. 2. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Board's Decision is incorrect and must be reversed. 
The Board exceeded its legislative authority by improperly inter-
preting and then applying Section 35-4-22(j)(5). The clear and 
uncontroverted facts in this case, when analyzed under Section 
35-4-22(j)(5), support a clear and convincing finding that the 
demonstrators are independent contractors. This Court should 
reverse the Board's Decision and make findings of fact substan-
tially in the form of those attached as proposed findings in 
Appendix E ,and after analyzing the 20 factors, make the conclu-
sion that the weight of the evidence supports a finding that the 
demonstrators are independent contractors. 
DATED this 10 day of December* 1?90. 
GARY E. -DdpTORrtAN 
of and frar 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Tasters, Ltd. 
^ 
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APPENDIX A 
SECTION 3 5 - 4 - 2 2 ( j ) ( 5 ) 
(5) Services performed by an individual for 
wages or under any contract of hire, written or 
oral, express or implied, are considered to be em-
ployment subject to this chapter, unless it is 
shown to the satisfaction of the commission that 
the individual is an independent contractor. The 
commission shall analyze all of the facts in Sub-
sections (A) through (T) under the common-law 
rules applicable to the employer-employee rela-
tionship to determine if an individual is an inde-
pendent contractor. An individual is an indepen-
dent contractor if the weight of the evidence sup-
ports that finding. The following factors are to be 
considered if applicable: 
(A) whether the individual works his or 
her own schedule or is required to comply 
with another person's instructions about 
when, where, and how work is to be per-
formed; 
(B) whether the individual uses his or her 
own methods and requires no specific train-
ing from the purchaser, or is trained by an 
experienced employee working with him or 
her, is required to take correspondence or 
other courses, attend meetings, and by other 
methods indicates that the employer wants 
the services performed; 
(C) whether the individual's services are 
independent of the success or continuation of 
a business or are merged into the business 
where success and continuation of the busi-
ness depends upon those services and the 
employer coordinates work with the work of 
others; 
(D) whether the individual's services may 
be assigned to others or must be rendered 
personally; 
(E) whether the individual has the right 
to hire, supervise, and pay other assistants 
pursuant to a contract under which the indi-
vidual is responsible only for the attainment 
of a result or the individual hires, super-
vises, and pays workers at the direction of 
the employer; 
(F) whether the individual was hired to do 
one job and has no continuous business rela-
tionship with the person for whom the ser-
vices are performed or continues to work for 
the same person year after year; 
(G) whether the individual establishes his 
or her own time schedule or does the em-
ployer set the time schedule; 
(H) whether the individual is free to work 
when and for whom he or she chooses, or is 
required to devote full-time to the business 
of the employer, and is restricted from doing 
other gainful work; 
<I) whether the individual uses t\is or her 
own office, desk, telephone, or other equip-
ment or is physically within the employer's 
direction and supervision; 
(J) whether the individual is free to per-
form services at his or her own pace or per-
forms services in the order or sequence set by 
the employer; 
(K) whether the individual submits no re-
ports or is required to submit regular oral or 
written reports to the employer; 
(L) whether the individual is paid by the 
job or on a straight commission or is paid by 
the employer in regular amounts at stated 
intervals; 
(M) whether the individual accounts for 
his or her own expenses or is paid by the 
employer for expenses; 
(N) whether the individual furnishes his 
or her own tools or is furnished tools and 
materials by the employer; 
(0) whether the individual has a real, es-
sential, and adequate investment in the 
business or has a lack of investment and de-
pends on the employer for such facilities; 
(P) whether the individual may realize a 
profit or suffer a loss as a result of services 
performed or cannot realize a profit or loss 
by making good or poor decisions; 
(Q) whether the individual works for a 
number of persons or firms at the same time 
or usually works for only one employer; 
• R) whether the individual has his or her 
own office and assistants, holds a business 
license, is listed in business directories, 
maintains a business telephone, or adver-
tises in newspapers or does not make ser-
vice* available except through a business in 
which he or she has no interest; 
<S) whether the individual may not be 
fired or discharged as long as he or she pro-
duces a result which meets contract specifi-
cations or may be discharged at any time; 
and 
<T) whether the individual agrees to com-
plete a specific service, and is responsible for 
its satisfaction or is legally obligated to per-
form the service, or may terminate his or her 
relationship with the employer at any time. 
APPENDIX B 
DLM/KM/AH/ab 
BOARD OF REVIEW 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
TASTERS, LTD. INC. 
Employer No. 1-117373-0 : 
: Case No. 90-A-4044-T 
DECISION 
: Case No. 90-BR-167-T 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Tasters Ltd, Inc. appeals the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge in the above entitled matter, which held Tasters to be subject to the 
Utah Empl oyment Security Act with respect to its employment of "demonstra-
tors". Specifically, the ALJ ruled the demonstrators could not be classified 
as independent contractors under §35-4-22(j) (5) of the Act. 
After careful consideration of the record and Tasters1 contentions 
on appeal, the Board of Review finds that the demonstrators in question do 
not meet the criteria of §35-4-22(j)(5) for independent contractors. The 
Board of Review therefore affirms the decision of the ALJ and holds the 
demonstrators to be in the employ of Tasters and subject to coverage under 
the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
Based upon its review of the record, the Board of Review makes the 
following findings of fact: Tasters is in the business of providing workers to 
brokers and manufacturers' representatives for the purpose of demonstrating 
various products in grocery and department stores. Each demonstrator works 
on an on-call, part-time basis with no guarantee of any particular schedule or 
number of work hours. Each demonstrator is free to accept or decline offered 
assignments as he or she sees f i t . 
Tasters gives each demonstrator a two-page set of written instruc-
tions governing the performance of their duties, including details such as 
att ire, length of breaks, product display, and demonstration tactics. Demon-
strators are prohibited from having children present, smoking, reading or 
sitting while on the job. Orientation and other training sessions are some-
times held for demonstrators, but attendance is not required. Payment for 
attendance at such meetings is made by Tasters' client brokers or manu-
facturers. 
Once a demonstrator accepts a particular assignment, he or she must 
report for work according to a set schedule. The demonstrators1 performance 
in the store may be monitored by Tasters' field representative or by Tasters' 
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clients. While individualized supervision is not generally provided, the 
field representative and clients give instruction when necessary. At the end 
of each demonstration, demonstrators ar§ required to submit a report to 
Tasters. 
The demonstrators are either provided the supplies used in demon-
strations or are reimbursed for the expense of such supplies. The demonstra-
tors provide equipment such as frying pans and card tables at their own 
expense. Tasters sometimes provides microwave ovens, then charges its clients 
rental fees for their use. 
Demonstrators are paid on a "per day" basis. Occasionally, demon-
strators delegate assignments to other demonstrators, who then are paid for 
the work. Tasters carries worker's compensation insurance on the demonstrators 
but provides no other fringe benefits and does not withhold payroll taxes from 
demonstrators1 paychecks. 
The demonstrators and Tasters are free to terminate their rela-
tionship with each other at any time. Demonstrators perform their services 
under Tasters' business name. Although they are free to perform services for 
other employers, none advertise, maintain offices or obtain business licenses. 
In judging whether the foregoing facts substantiate Tasters1 posi-
tion that its demonstrators are independent contractors, the Board of Review 
is guided by §35-4-22(j) (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act, which pro-
vides in material part as follows: 
Services performed by an individual for wages or under any 
contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, are 
considered to be employment subject to this chapter unless i t 
is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that the indi-
vidual is an independent contractor. The commission shall 
analyze all of the facts in Subsections (A) through (T) under 
the common-law rules applicable to the employer-employee rela-
tionship to determine if an individual is an independent 
contractor. An individual is an independent contractor i f the 
weight of the evidence supports that finding. The following 
ing factors are to be considered i f applicable. (Factors A 
through T follow, but have been ommitted due to their length.) 
Under §35-4-22(j) (5) , above, wages paid to an individual for personal services 
are subject to unemployment insurance contributions unless the services are 
performed by an independent contractor. §35-4-22(j)T5] establishes 20 
separate factors for assessing whether status as an independent contractor 
exists, i t also recognizes that each factor may not be pertinent in every case 
and should be considered only i f applicable. To understand and apply 
§35-4-22(j) (5)'s 20 factors, i t is necessary to understand their development 
in the Act. 
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Prior to April 24, 1989, §35-4-22(j) (5) used a two-part test to 
determine independent contractor status. First, the individual performing 
services must be free from control and direction from the party for whom the 
services were provided. Second, the individual performing services must be 
independently established in an occupation, trade or business of his own. 
However, because the Internal Revenue Service also made determinations of 
independent contractor status using only the test of "control and direction", 
a lack of conformity existed between determinations of the Department and 
Internal Revenue Service. To increase conformity, the Legislature repealed 
the two part test of §35-4-22(j)(5) and replaced i t with a test that relied 
upon 20 factors the IRS had identified as generally significant in determining 
"control and direction". In summary, §35-4-22(j)(5)'s two-part test of 
freedom from control and direction and independent establishment in business 
was replaced by a 20-part test focusing on control and direction. 
§35-4-22(j) (5) as amended recognizes that not each of its 20 fac-
tors (A through T) will apply in every situation. §35-4-22(j)(5) further 
recognizes the necessity of "weighing" factors according to their significance 
under the facts of a particular case. The Board of Review must therefore 
identify those factors which are signficant in the present case, then deter-
mine whether the evidence with respect to those factors establish the freedom 
from control and direction necessary to support a finding of independent con-
tractor status. 
Factors A, B, 6, J and K relate to the amount of direct control 
exercised over the individual in the performance of his or her duties. As 
the extent of control over details increases, an indiviudual will be more 
likely to be considered an employee. In this case, Tasters tells its dem-
onstrators vtfien to report for work, when to leave, and how long to spend on 
breaks and lunch. It tells them to remain standing, not to smoke, not to 
have children with them, and not to read. Demonstrators are instructed on 
proper dress and personal demeanor. The foregoing is only a sample of the 
detailed instructions Tasters gives its demonstrators. While Tasters is not 
staffed to the extent that such matters can be closely observed, Tasters has 
nonetheless exercised its right to give the instructions. The Board of 
Review concludes the foregoing factors strongly support a finding that Tasters 
exerts control and direction over the demonstrators. 
A second group of factors, C, F, H, 0, P, Q and R, pertain to the 
degree of independence and separation existing between the individuals per-
forming services and the entity for which services are performed. A high 
degree of separation tends to establish an independent contractor relation-
ship while integration indicates an employment relationship. Due to the 
unique nature of Tasters' business, the Board considers many of the factors 
in this category to be of l i t t l e significance. For example, Tasters1 business 
does not require full-time employees or a high degree of contact with its 
demonstrators. Nor does i t require or permit a substantial investment in 
equipment. However, the Board does consider factor R to be significant. The 
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demonstrators had not taken the steps to estaablish independent business 
activity that an independent contractor would be expected to take. In con-
clusion, most factors in this category are not significant in evaluating 
Tasters' control over its demonstrators, except factor R, which supports the 
finding that the demonstrators were not independent contractors. 
The third category of factors, items D, E, L, S and T, relate to 
the issue of whether a continuing personal relationship between employer and 
employee has been established, or alternatively, whether the relationship was 
merely a discrete, job-by-job arrangement in which performance is enforceable 
under contract law. Certain of the factors in this category are significant 
to this case and support a finding of independent contractor status. For 
example, Tasters permitted the demonstrators to delegate assignments to 
others and compensated demonstrators on a "per job" basis. On balance, the 
nature of the legal relationship between Tasters and the demonstrators re-
sembles that of an independent contractor relationship. 
The last category of factors, items I , M and N, focus on the demon-
strators' investment in equipment and the allocation of expenses between the 
demonstrations and Tasters. These factors are not useful under the circum-
stances of this case since equipment requirements are minimal and expenses 
are reimbursed by Tasters' clients. 
In summary, the 20 factors of §35-4-22(j)(5) have been evaluated by 
the Board of Review and classified into four general groups. The f i rst group 
relates to the amount of direct control exercised by Tasters, while the 
second group pertains to the extent of integration of the demonstrators into 
Tasters' business. In light of the facts of this case, both categories 
indicate that the employment relationship between Tasters and its demonstra-
tors is that of employer and employees. While the third group of factors, 
pertaining to the legal relationship between Tasters and its demonstrators, 
favors a contrary conclusion and the fourth group, pertaining to allocation 
of expenses and investment, is neutral, the f irst and second categories are 
the most significant to this case. The Board of Review concludes that 
the weight of the evidence when viewed under the standards set forth in 
§35-4-22(j) (5) (A) through (T) does not support a finding that Tasters' 
demonstrators are independent contractors. The Board of Review therefore 
holds that they are in employment subject to the provisions of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. 
Two additional points in Tasters' appeal require brief discussion. 
First, Tasters argues that the questionnaire prepared by the Department and 
completed by Tasters demonstrators should have been excluded from the record 
because they lacked statistical validity, were not understood by the demon-
strators and contained questions which did not conform to the 20 factors set 
forth in §35-4-(22)j)(5). The questionnaires are insignificant to the Board 
of Review's decision in this matter, since the Board of Review relied instead 
upon the demonstrators' testimony from the appeal hearing, given under oath 
and subject to cross-examination. Even i f the questionnaires were removed 
from the record, the Board of Review's decision would remain unchanged. 
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The second point requiring response is Tasters' contention that a 
previous informal IRS determination that one of Tasters1 demonstrators was an 
independent contractor should prompt a similar determination in the present 
case. However, the Board of Review must apply the provisions of the Utah 
Empl qyment Security Act according to the facts in the record before i t . 
Where the Employment Security Act and federal standards are the same, i t is 
probable that the same result will be reached. Occasionally, differences in 
fact-finding will result in contrary decisions. In this case, the Board has 
had the benefit of exhaustive fact finding and active participation from the 
Department and Tasters. The Board of Review is unwilling to ignore such a 
complete record in order to adopt an informal opinion of the IRS which appears 
to violate the IRS1 own precedents. 
This decision becomes final on the date i t is mailed, and any 
further appeal must be made within 30 days from the date of mailing. Your 
appeal must be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. To f i l e 
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the 
Court a Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, 
pursuant to §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and 
Rule 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, followed by a Docketing 
Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
Dated this 10th day of July, 1990. 
Date Mailed: July 20, 1990 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on this £<$ — 
day of July, 1990, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, United States 
mail to: 
Tasters Ltd., Inc. 
Attn: Sandi Cohn 
1381 East 2100 South, Suite B 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Gary E. Doctorman 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Tasters Ltd., Inc. 
50 West Broadway, Suite 400 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
l^ i 
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VERY IMPORTANT THINGS TO REMEMBER!!! 
MOST IMPORTANT THING TO REMEMBER: CALL YOUR STORE NOW AND THEN CALL AGAIN 
ABOUT THREE DAYS BEFORE TO CONFIRM YOUR DEMO! !!!! 
Please read this before you go to work, and go through your training 
materials often. 
1. Dress appropriately, loc"^ professional. Flease wear an APRON! 
2. Be on time. 
3. Always set a beautiful table and use a neat tablecloth. 
4. Take a careful inventory of your product and write the numbers 
on your report sheet. 
5. Serve a SAMPLE size serving of your product. 
6. ALWAYS use the product name. 
7. Try to sample every person that comes into your store. 
8. Keep an accurate count of the units used for your demo. 
9. Keep your area clean and do not eat at your demo table. 
10. Take h hour lunch and two 15 minute breaks. Try not to have 
all of the demonstrators go to lunch at the same time. 
11. SMILE!!! Have fun and be creative. 
12. 3e AGGRESSIVE and cry to SiILL OUT l l l l l 
13. Complete your report sheet, filling in every section. Attach a receipt 
if you have any expenses, we cannot pay you without it. Sign it and 
have your manager sign too. 
14. MAIL YOUR REPORT ON YOUR WAY HOME AT THE END OF YOUR DEMO!!! 
PLEASE DO NOT MENTION THE NAME OF ANY OTHER STORE WHEN YOU ARE AT WORK. YOU 
ARE REPRESENTING ONLY THE STORE THAT YOU ARE IN ON THE DAY OF YOUR DEMO AND IT 
WOULD BE IN VERY POOR TASTE TO EVEN MENTION ANOTHER COMPANY. THE SAME GOES FOR 
THE PRODUCT THAT YOU ARE SELLING. IT IS THE VERY BEST AND THERE IS NO NEED TO 
COMPARE IT, BY NAME, TO ANY OTHER ITEM. 
1/87 
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APPENDIX D 
SECTION 3 5 - 4 - 2 2 ( j ) ( 5 ) (1988) 
(5) Services performed by an individual for wages or under any con-
tract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, are considered to be 
employment subject to this chapter, unless it is shown to the satisfaction 
of the commission that: 
(A) the individual has been and will continue to be free from con-
trol or direction over the performance of those services, both under 
his contract of hire and in fact; and 
(B) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently es-
tablished trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same na-
ture as that involved in the contract of service. 
APPENDIX E 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The demonstrators are entitled to choose their 
schedule of when, where and how their work is performed. R. 144, 
145, 151, 189, 190. 
2. Although demonstrations must be done in a grocery 
store, demonstrators are free to accept or turn down where a dem-
onstration is to be performed without repercussion and the demon-
strator may determine in which store they work or in what city 
they work. R. 151, 222, 223. 
3. Demonstrators determine how the work is to be per-
formed. R. 151, 203, 204, 216. 
4. Demonstrators use their own methods and require no 
specific training to perform the demonstration. R. 148, 151, 
152, 159, 181, 182, 185, 186, 190. 
5. Demonstrators are not required to take correspon-
dence courses, attend meetings, and while Tasters does offer an 
initial orientation, it is not required. R. 148, 159, 182, 218. 
6. The demonstrators determine the detail of their 
work and they are not supervised by Tasters. R. 213, 215, 216, 
217. 
7. Demonstrators1 services may and have been assigned 
to others and need not be rendered personally. R. 152, 170, 191, 
196, 218, 219. 
8. Demonstrators have the right to hire, supervise 
and pay assistants pursuant to a contract under which demonstra-
tor is responsible only for the attainment of a result. R. 152, 
196, 204, 205. 
9. Demonstrators do not hire, supervise or pay other 
demonstrators at the direction of Tasters. R. 152, 196, 204, 205. 
10. Demonstrators are hired to do a specific individ-
ual demonstration and do not have a continuous business relation-
ship with Tasters year after year as typified by a typical 
employer-employee relationship. R. 218, 219, 222, 223. 
11. A demonstrator establishes his or her own time 
schedule, the time schedule is not set by Tasters. R. 151, 152, 
223, 201. 
12. Demonstrators are free to work when and for whom 
they choose. R. 148, 192, 223, 219, 220. 
13. Demonstrators are not required to work full time 
for Tasters and are not restricted from other gainful work. R. 
219, 220. 
14. Some demonstrators have other full time employ-
ment. R. 219, 220. 
15. Some demonstrators directly compete with Tasters. 
R. 219, 220. 
16. Demonstrators use their own equipment and not the 
equipment of Tasters. R. 148, 166, 182. 
17. Tasters does not provide any services or pay any 
overhead in connection with the services of demonstrators. 
R. 223, 232. 
18. Tasters does not provide written evaluations of 
the demonstrator's performance. R. 192,225. 
19. Tasters has only two full time employed office 
staff and three part time to arrange demonstrations with 2f000 
demonstrators. R. 207. 
20. Tasters does not perform any performance reviews, 
award exceptional performance, does not discipline marginal per-
formance, nor is the success or the failure of the demonstration 
graded in any way. R. 225, 226, 227. 
21. Demonstrators perform their demonstration at their 
own pace and the order or sequence is not set by Tasters. R. 
205, 224, 225. 
22. Demonstrators submit a one page report at the con-
clusion of a demonstration to verify that the demonstration was 
held and to provide background information for the manufacturer 
and not for Tasters. R. 225, 226, 227, 209. 
23. The manufacturer or distributor is responsible for 
the reimbursement of incidental expenses, and incidental expenses 
are not reimbursed by Tasters. R. 193, 225, 226, 227. 
24. Demonstrators are paid a demonstration fee for 
each job and the demonstration fee is negotiated depending on the 
time, place and type of demonstration. Tasters does not paid the 
demonstrators in regular amounts at stated intervals. R. 204, 
228. 
25. Demonstrators account for their own expenses and 
Tasters does not pay expenses. R. 193, 229, 232. 
26. Demonstrators furnish their own equipment. 
R. 148, 166, 224, 229. 
27. Demonstrators have a real and adequate investment 
in their demonstration business in proportion to their earnings. 
R. 172, 188, 194, 245, 246. 
28. The demonstrators may realize a profit or suffer a 
loss as a result of the services performed and are responsible 
for any negligent acts. R. 194. 
29. Eighty percent of the demonstrators solicit work 
from Tasters through the use of their own personal telephone and 
solicit work from other demonstration companies by the same 
method. R. 221, 222, 223. 
30. As long as the demonstrator performs or causes to 
be performed the demonstration, the demonstrator is entitled to 
payment of the demonstration fee. R. 228. 
31. If a demonstrator does not complete a demonstra-
tion they are not paid. R. 210. 
32. The Internal Revenue Service in applying their 20 
factor test, found the demonstrators to be independent contrac-
tors. R. 104-109, 110, 111. 
APPENDIX P 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The demonstrators are entitled to choose their 
schedule of when, where and how their work is performed. R. 144, 
145, 151, 189, 190. 
2. Although demonstrations must be done in a grocery 
store, demonstrators are free to accept or turn down where a dem-
onstration is to be performed without repercussion and the demon-
strator may determine in which store they work or in what city 
they work. R. 151, 222, 223. 
3. Demonstrators determine how the work is to be per-
formed. R. 151, 203, 204, 216. 
4. Demonstrators use their own methods and require no 
specific training to perform the demonstration. R. 148, 151, 
152, 159, 181, 182, 185, 186, 190. 
5. Demonstrators are not required to take correspon-
dence courses, attend meetings, and while Tasters does offer an 
initial orientation, it is not required. R. 148, 159, 182, 218. 
6. The demonstrators determine the detail of their 
work and they are not supervised by Tasters. R. 213, 215, 216, 
217. 
7. Demonstrators' services may and have been assigned 
to others and need not be rendered personally. R. 152, 170, 191, 
196, 218, 219. 
8. Demonstrators have the right to hire, supervise 
and pay assistants pursuant to a contract under which demonstra-
tor is responsible only for the attainment of a result. R. 152, 
196, 204, 205. 
9. Demonstrators do not hire, supervise or pay other 
demonstrators at the direction of Tasters. R. 152, 196, 204, 205. 
10. Demonstrators are hired to do a specific individ-
ual demonstration and do not have a continuous business relation-
ship with Tasters year after year as typified by a typical 
employer-employee relationship. R. 218, 219, 222, 223. 
11. A demonstrator establishes his or her own time 
schedule, the time schedule is not set by Tasters. R. 151, 152, 
223, 201. 
12. Demonstrators are free to work when and for whom 
they choose. R. 148, 192, 223, 219, 220. 
13. Demonstrators are not required to work full time 
for Tasters and are not restricted from other gainful work. R. 
219, 220. 
14. Some demonstrators have other full time employ-
ment. R. 219, 220. 
15. Some demonstrators directly compete with Tasters. 
R. 219, 220. 
16. Demonstrators use their own equipment and not the 
equipment of Tasters. R. 148, 166, 182. 
17. Tasters does not provide any services or pay any 
overhead in connection with the services of demonstrators. 
R. 223, 232. 
18. Tasters does not provide written evaluations of 
the demonstrator's performance. R. 192,225. 
19. Tasters has only two full time employed office 
staff and three part time to arrange demonstrations with 2,000 
demonstrators. R. 207. 
20. Tasters does not perform any performance reviews, 
award exceptional performance, does not discipline marginal per-
formance, nor is the success or the failure of the demonstration 
graded in any way. R. 225, 226, 227. 
21. Demonstrators perform their demonstration at their 
own pace and the order or sequence is not set by Tasters. R. 
205, 224, 225. 
22. Demonstrators submit a one page report at the con-
clusion of a demonstration to verify that the demonstration was 
held and to provide background information for the manufacturer 
and not for Tasters. R. 225, 226, 227, 209. 
23. The manufacturer or distributor is responsible for 
the reimbursement of incidental expenses, and incidental expenses 
are not reimbursed by Tasters. R. 193, 225, 226, 227. 
24. Demonstrators are paid a demonstration fee for 
each job and the demonstration fee is negotiated depending on the 
time, place and type of demonstration. Tasters does not paid the 
demonstrators in regular amounts at stated intervals. R. 204, 
228. 
25. Demonstrators account for their own expenses and 
Tasters does not pay expenses. R. 193f 229, 232. 
26. Demonstrators furnish their own equipment. 
R. 148, 166, 224, 229. 
27. Demonstrators have a real and adequate investment 
in their demonstration business in proportion to their earnings. 
R. 172, 188, 194, 245, 246. 
28. The demonstrators may realize a profit or suffer a 
loss as a result of the services performed and are responsible 
for any negligent acts. R. 194. 
29. Eighty percent of the demonstrators solicit work 
from Tasters through the use of their own personal telephone and 
solicit work from other demonstration companies by the same 
method. R. 221, 222, 223. 
30. As long as the demonstrator performs or causes to 
be performed the demonstration, the demonstrator is entitled to 
payment of the demonstration fee. R. 228. 
31. If a demonstrator does not complete a demonstra-
tion they are not paid. R. 210. 
32. The Internal Revenue Service in applying their 20 
factor test, found the demonstrators to be independent contrac-
tors. R. 104-109, 110, 111. 
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DEMONSTRATION REPORT 
1381 East 2100 South, Suite I 
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CALL STORE NOWTO CONFIRM AVAILABILITY OF PRODUCT AND AGAIN 2 DAYS BEFORE DEMO 
_ N a m e of Manager called to verify dema \JJ*n/ Oats Catted 
Project # • _ 
Store Name:. 
Tu«a WWQ Thur 
t of Demo; _ 
SunO MonO fe  VMD nO F £ ( S a & 
^¥ Store # : ' ' Telephone # : Dept: Del D Meat)g^ Produce O 
Address: 
specify # of units Mr caszj2JjLL. Areyou reportinqin units _ _ - cases . ^ . _ or lbs.. 
igInventory: C/ ,3nflJL<LL4 _ / # C&<U<* 
Please, a 
Product 
Beginnin  Inventor : 
Less Ending Inventory: 
Equals Total 
Less Samples Used For Demo: 
Amount Sold y 
Regular Price 3/i'lrj 
Total Expenses (if any). 
•Receipt must be attached for Reimbursement 
^ Sale Price: 
M senr 
yrrr/.-TT, ii.4^ 
2 SJ**J^ 
y ^ fftx.<^^y 
Return extra coupons to Tasters 
SAVE EMPTY DEMO WRAPPERS FOR 
COUPONS: At start of D e m o ^ a ^ Z _ _ l r f N u m b e r Distributed 
Use this credit form: Yes D N o ) s ^ 
If yes. throw empty wrappers away after counting. 
If no, leave empty wrappers with department manager 
Leave yellow copy with department manager Yes O 
Credit Expense incurred: 
(Do not include items paid for) 
CREDIT MEMO 
NoD /Of. 
@$ 
@$ 
@$ 
@$ 
Position of Vbur Demo 
List ALL other Demos 
Store Traffic: Light 
Number of Persons Sampled JLA 
Consumer Response : !^^ , 
.Overcast _ X . Rain. .Snow. 
Comments by Demo 
Manager s Comments: *^ 
Manager's Signature: 
W' /? nnnnS qooo4i 
Demonstrator's Signature:£ efiwiff-—---^^' ~ " - o«f ^^. 
Days Worked Sun Mon Tue Wed Thurs/^y <Sap 
Sec#. / / / - ^ - 9**3 ^ ^ 
Demonstrator - Keen Pink fnn« • 
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GARY E. DOCTORMAN 
RICHARD M. MARSH 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
50 West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
TASTERS LTD., INC. 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Tamara Eklund, being first duly sworn, depose and 
state as follows: 
1. I am a paralegal at the law firm of Parsons Behle 
& Latimer, counsel for Tasters Ltd., Inc., and I have personal 
knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit. 
2. On November 30, 1990, I went to the office of the 
Utah State Senate and with the assistance of personnel at that 
office, located the recording of Utah State Senate containing the 
AFFIDAVIT OF TAMARA EKLUND 
Case No. 900451-CA 
hearings on Senate Bill No. 164 (Section 35-4-22(j)(5), Utah Code 
Ann.) from February 9, 1989. 
3. I carefully listened to that portion of the 
recording containing the statement by Senator Nielson concerning 
a legislative intent behind Senate Bill No. 164. To insure that 
I was accurately understanding the recording, I listened to it 
three times. 
4. Attached hereto is a transcription of that portion 
of the recording of the hearings from Senate Bill No. 164 which I 
recorded. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this 7th day of December, 1990. 
, ^ y \ : - M f s 
' TAMARA 
i^U^ 
EKLUND 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7 th day of 
December, 1990. 
My Commission Expires: 
284/120790A 
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SENATE BILL NO. 164 
Senator Nielson: Senate Bill 164 is to define the independent 
contractor versus the employee. We've had, we 
have on the books now a test, ABC test, and we 
sometime back eliminated C. There is a problem 
with this test in that it doesn't - well it's 
created somewhat of a hardship especially on 
small businesses in that there were those 
outside the business area that didn't under-
stand the difference between an independent 
contractor and a employee. This Bill is a 
little thicker than it ought to be, but the 
meat of the Bill is on page 14. On page 14 
it's the entire and only intent of the Bill to 
adopt the IRS test as the definition of an 
independent contract versus an employee and we 
have tried to adopt the IRS schedule as nearly 
as possible and place it in the code, and that 
is the intent of the Bill. I'd be happy to 
answer any questions you might have on the 
Bill. 
Speaker: I'm seeing none Mr. President. 
I'm seeing no questions. Would it be proper to 
move — 
Mr. President: Make the motion. 
Speaker: At this time under suspension of the rules 
[inaudible] that this Bill be considered for 
the second and third reading and up for final 
passage. 
Mr. President: All those in favor say Aye. 
Aye. 
All opposed. Motion carries. 
284/113090A 
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